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ABSTRACT 
The rapid advancement in wireless technology along with their low cost and ease 
of deployment have been attracting researchers academically and commercially. 
Researchers from private and public sectors are investing into enhancing the reliability, 
robustness, and security of radio frequency (RF) communications to accommodate the 
demand and enhance lifestyle. RF base communications -by nature- are slower and more 
exposed to attacks than a wired base (LAN). Deploying such networks in various cutting-
edge mobile platforms (e.g. VANET, IoT, Autonomous robots) adds new challenges that 
impact the quality directly. Moreover, adopting such networks in public outdoor areas 
make them vulnerable to various attacks (regardless of the attacker motive). Therefore, the 
quality and security of the communications cannot be neglected especially when 
developing outdoor wireless applications/networks. 
While some wireless applications and platforms aim to provide comfort and 
infotainment, others are more critical to protect and save lives. Thus, the need for mobile 
broadband connections has been increased to accommodate such applications. The FCC 
took the first step to regulate and assure the quality when using these technologies by 
allocating spectrums and issuing standards and amendments (e.g. IEEE802.11a, b, g, n, 
and p) to deliver reliable and secure communications.  
In this dissertation, we introduce several problems related to the security and quality 
of communications in outdoor environments. Although we focus on the ISM-RF bands 
iv 
UHF and SHF (licensed and unlicensed) and their applications when solving quality and 
security issues nevertheless, the concept of propagating signals through the air for 
communications remain the same across other ISM bands. Therefore, problems and their 
solutions in this work can be applied to different wireless technologies with respect to 
environment and mobility. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Technologies have been evolving rapidly over the last decade. In particular, 
wireless (Radio Frequency-RF) communications have been gaining a wide interest from 
governments, researchers, and companies. The low cost along with ease of deployment and 
maintenance, have made wireless technology a fruitful research field academically and 
commercially.  
Nowadays, different forms of wireless communications can be seen everywhere. 
Smart phones, computers, televisions, appliances, aerial vehicles and even cars have been 
manufactured and employed with wireless capabilities. When wireless technology was first 
discovered, it used to be a luxury not everyone can afford. Nowadays, their affordability, 
capability, and reliability have made the new era moves toward utilizing the technology to 
lower expenses and provide safety in almost every field (military, health, industry, 
education ...etc.)  
In 2009, US-DOT released a statistical analysis showing that cars are the leading 
cause of death for people ages between 4 to 34 years old. Statistics showed that more than 
33000 deaths and 5,800,000 crashes per year in addition to over $78 billion cost of urban 
congestion are caused by vehicles [20]. Although several studies have investigated threats 
on roads and tried to propose solutions based on the cause of accidents (human, 
environment, or vehicle –related), the US-DOT have acknowledged cars impact on 
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economy and people’s safety which led the department to conclude that roads are no longer 
as safe to drive on as used to.  
The new era is moving toward employing wireless communications to make cars 
intelligent to save resources (financially), enhance safety of drivers, and provide comfort. 
Therefore, car manufacturers and governments have been cooperating and investing into 
proposing new solutions. In the early 2000s, Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) was 
only seen as a one-to-one application of Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET). Since then, 
VANET have been developed into research field until officially introduced earlier in 2005. 
The unique property of VANET is the collaboration between vehicles and networks 
technologies. Therefore, VANET has attracted cars manufacturers, governments, 
researchers, and companies. As a result of these efforts, VANET was proposed and 
standardized by IEEE group over the globe. Consequently, cars’ manufacturers started 
investing to research and produce “wireless cars”. For instance, Volkswagen has enabled 
their cars to talk to each other [64], while Google have successfully made a fully automated 
car that can drive and park itself [65]. Moreover, Cadillac (General Motors’ Company) has 
promised to release its first vehicle equipped with ITS (Intelligent Transport System) using 
DSRC (Dedicated Short-Range Communication) in late-2015 [66]. 
While VANET has been gaining popularity, its security and privacy have been a 
concern. Since drivers’ safety is the ultimate goal behind proposing VANET, many 
security risks needed to be addressed to ensure the normal operation of the network and 
hence, enhance safety on roads. Typical issues such as the reliability and availability of the 
network in highly changeable mobile environment have been addressed however; they are 
yet to be finalized. Although VANET shows a potential enhancement of safety and comfort 
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on roads, the new technology (based on inserting Wireless Access in Vehicle Environment 
WAVE) is still vulnerable to most of attacks that work against radio frequency 
communications. Yet, the great potential of the technology led to the development of many 
VANET-based applications and deployment by IT-companies, governments (e.g, toll-
collections), and cars’ manufacturers (e.g, traffic congestion and emergency vehicle 
warning systems).  
Since drivers’ safety is the main goal behind proposing VANET, and it is dependent 
on the successful delivery of early warning messages. Therefore, establishing and 
maintaining reliable communications links between nodes is crucial and challenging due 
to the nature of RF-communications (using wireless medium as communications mean). 
Moreover, the characteristics of the outdoor environment (encompass high mobility of 
nodes, irregular surrounding noise, and unpredictable weather phenomena), has made 
VANET a challenging research field. 
 Here we focus on the security aspect of VANET. We investigate the feasibility of 
launching intentional interference (jamming) attack to disrupt the normal operation of the 
network. We analyze the security risks caused by intentional interference attacks in outdoor 
mobile environments from message delivery aspect. We also provide a low-latency 
jamming detection solution to solve the intentional interference problem in outdoor mobile 
environment. 
1.1 VANET OVERVIEW  
 Since VANET was proposed earlier in 2005, many terminologies and acronyms have 
been used that refer to the same technology concept (vehicular networking). Although these 
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terms may differ in technical low-level details, but generally they are the same. The most 
commonly found terms are: 
• ITS (Intelligent Transport Systems) 
• IVC (Inter-Vehicle Communication) 
• DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communication) 
• WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicle Environment) 
 Throughout this dissertation we may use variety of these terms to refer to the same 
technology except when explicitly stated. 
VANET consists of two types of wireless nodes. The combination of i) cars equipped with 
wireless capabilities, ii) and infrastructures towers like nodes forms a VANET. This allows 
communications among and between Infrastructures (Road-Side nodes) and cars (mobile 
nodes) Fig.1.1. By doing so, many VANET based applications were proposed and 
developed to serve the ultimate goal of VANET (enhancing safety and comfort on road). 
These applications can be categorized based on their serviceability into: i) Safety, ii) 
Traffic Management, and iii) Maintenance & Comfort enhancement -applications 
Table.1.1. While some of these applications are developed to provide comfort and 
infotainments, some others can save lives and money.  
 
Figure 1.1: Nodes’ and Communications’ Types in VANET 
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Table 1.1: Examples of some VANET Based Applications 
VANET Based Applications 
Safety Traffic Management Maintenance and Comfort 
Traffic Signal Violation Warning Highway Merge Assistance Safety Recall Notice 
Stop Sign Violation Warning Cooperative Cruise Control Just-in-time repair notification 
Left-Turn Assistance Cooperative Platooning Wireless Diagnosis 
Intersection Collision Warning Fleet Management Visibility Enhancer 
Pedestrian Crossing Information 
Adaptive Speed Limit 
Based on Road Conditions 
Cooperative glare 
reduction/Headlamp aiming 
Emergency Vehicles HAZMAT Cargo Tracking Parking Spot Locator 
Vehicle Safety Inspection Electronic Toll Payment GPS Correction 
Electronic License Plate  
Instant Messaging Between 
Vehicles 
Electronic Driver License  Mobile Access to Vehicle data 
Stolen Vehicle Tracking  POI Notification 
SOS Services  Fueling Info. 
Pre-Crash Sensing   
Road Condition Warning   
1.2 STANDARDS AND SPECTRUM  
VANET has been recognized globally, and different regions have allocated 
different spectrum, frequencies, and transmission ranges. Table.1.2 summarizes the global 
spectrum allocation dedicated for VANET uses in different regions. 
Table 1.2: DSRC/WAVE GLOBAL SPECTRUM ALLOCATION 
Region Frequency (MHz) Band Range 
North America (US) 5850 – 5925 75 MHz 1000 m 
Japan 5770 - 5850 80 MHz 30 m 
Europe 5795 - 5815 20 Mhz 15 – 20 m 
In October 1999, the U.S. Federal Communication Commission (FCC) released an 
official announcement of allocating 75MHz spectrum in 5.9GHz range for Intelligent 
Transportation System (ITS) uses, which empowered by wireless communications Fig.1.2. 
The announcement dictates the FCC decision to use 5.850-5.925GHz band for a variety of 
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Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC) uses to create more robust environment 
with higher noise resistance compared to the current 2.4GHz. [7]-[12]  
 
Figure.1.2: Spectrum Allocation for VANET Communications 
DSRC/WAVE consists of a set of IEEE1609 standards for wireless access in 
vehicular environment. It is important to distinguish between the former DSRC standard 
in 915MHz range (used primarily in ETC applications), and the wireless access in 
Vehicular Environment (WAVE) standard approved for the current 5,9 GHz DSRC band 
Table.1.3. 
Table.1.3: DSRC 915MHz Vs. 5.9 GHz Comparison 
Parameter 915 MHz 5.9 GHz 
Used Spectrum (MHz) 12 75 
Data Rate (Mbps) 0.5 6 – 27 
Maximum Range (m) 30 Up to 1000 
Channel Capacity 1 to 2 unlicensed channels 7 licensed channels 
Power (Downlink) Nominally < 40 dBm Nominally < 33dBm 
Power (Uplink) Nominally < 6 dBm Nominally < 33dBm 
The IEEE1609 family, IEEE802.11p, and Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE-
J2735) standards illustrate the WAVE protocol stack Fig.1.3. They define the main 
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architectural components of two types of nodes (On Board & Road Side –Units), WAVE 
interface, and describe the functionality of WAVE based applications (approved in 2010). 
• IEEE P1609.0 “Draft Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments 
(WAVE) – Architecture.” 
• IEEE 1609.1 “Trial Use Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments 
(WAVE) – Resource Manager.” 
• IEEE 1609.2 “Trial Use Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments 
(WAVE) – Security Services for Applications and Management messages.” 
• IEEE 1609.3 “Trial Use Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments 
(WAVE) – Networking Services.” 
• IEEE 1609.4 “Trial Use Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments 
(WAVE) – Multi-Channel Operations.” 
• IEEE P1609.11 “Over-the-Air Data Exchange Protocol for Intelligent 
Transportation Systems (ITS).” 
• IEEE 802.11p “Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer 
(PHY) specifications – Amendment: Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments.”  
The IEEE802.11p standard is an amendment to IEEE802.11 (known as Wi-Fi) for 
WAVE applications. It adopts the OFDM PHY on 10MHz channels in 5.9GHz frequency 
band. The subcarrier spacing and supported data rate are halved and its symbol and guard 
intervals are doubled. Table.1.4 summarizes other OFDM parameters comparison which 
makes DSRC more robust and provides low-latency (50ms) in noisy environment. 
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Figure.1.3: WAVE ISO/OSI Protocol Stack 
Table.1.4: OFDM Wi-Fi Vs. OFDM WAVE Comparison 
Parameter WAVE Wi-Fi 
Spectrum (GHz) 5.9 2.4 and 5 
Bandwidth (MHz) 10 20 
Data Rate (Mbps) 3,4.5, 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 27 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 54 
Modulation No change BPSK, QPSK, 16QAM, 64QAM 
Data Subcarriers No change 48 
Pilot Subcarriers No change 4 
FFT/IFFT period (µs) 6.4 3.2 
Subcarrier Spacing 0.15625 0.3125 
Guard Interval (µs) 1.6 0.8 
OFDM Symbol Interval 
(µs) 
8 4 
Preamble Duration (µs) 32 16 
1.3 CHANNELS ALLOCATION, AND ACCESS MODES 
 The FCC has allocated 75MHz of the spectrum in the 5.9GHz band for DSRC uses. 
The DSRC spectrum used in the IEEE802.11p standard is divided into seven 10MHz 
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channels with data rates available from 3-27Mbps. One Control Channel (CCH-178) is 
designated for data management and transmitting important safety messages, and six other 
Service Channels (SCH-172, 174, 176, 180, 182, 184) used for exchanging non-safety data. 
Also offered is the option to combine two 10MHz Channels (174, 176) and (180, 182) to 
form a 20MHz channels (175 and 181) respectively with data rates from 6-54 Mbps. 
Based on the standard regulations, there are four channel access options can be used in the 
CCH and SCH interval Fig.1.5. 1) Continuous: where vehicle stays in the CCH to exchange 
safety messages when available. 2) Alternating: by accessing the CCH to transmit safety 
messages and switches to SCHs to transmit non-safety messages at the beginning of each 
channel’s interval. 3) Immediate: this option is specified to allow vehicles to have an 
immediate access to SCHs, after receiving an immediate request access, without waiting 
for the next SCH interval. 4) Extended: allows vehicles to remain in SCH without any 
pause for CCH access. Vehicles shall choose between continuous control channel or 
alternating service channel accesses Fig.1.4 depending on which is applicable, unless an 
immediate or extended access request received. 
 
Figure 1.4: Alternating Channel Access Option in 802.11p Networks 
1.4 DSRC/WAVE DEVICES 
 There are two classes of devices in a WAVE system: Vehicles equipped with On- 
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-Board Units (OBUs) and infrastructures towers-like Road-Side Units (RSUs). OBU and 
RSU are equivalent to Mobile Station (MS) and Base Station (BS) in the cellular network. 
As a result, the combination of RSUs and OBUs enables mainly two classes of 
communications, Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) Fig.1.6.  
 
Figure.1.5: Receiver Multi-Channel Access Operations defined by IEEE1609 standards 
for the MAC Sub-layer extension in DSRC protocol stack (CCH, SCH: Control, Service 
channel) 
 
 
Figure.1.6: Two Communication’s classes among wireless nodes in VANET 
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 Although other terms may be seen such as Vehicle-to-roadside-unit (V2R) and 
Vehicle-to-OBU/RSU (V2X), they are still derived from the main communications V2V 
and V2I. 
▪ RSUs are stationary towers-like infrastructures deployed on the side of roads. RSUs 
are expected to provide coverage (up to 1000m) to disseminate, exchange, and 
forward data among nodes. Although RSUs are expected to serve as the main 
component to spread safety messages within their range, yet no clear definition 
exists regarding their placements on the roads. 
▪  OBUs are vehicles equipped with wireless capabilities to exchange data on roads. 
These data can be safety related or application-based service data.  
Based on the different mobility nature of RSUs and OBUs, several challenges appeared 
very quickly concerning communications range, noise, multipath, and Doppler Effect 
which will be discussed in the next chapter [2], [11], [15], [19]. 
1.5 SUMMARY 
The new era targets at making cars more intelligent to enhance drivers’ safety and 
comfort. Equipping cars with wireless communication capabilities was the first step toward 
achieving such a goal. The Intelligent transportation system (ITS), which is a national 
program [7], intended to use modern computers and communications to make driving safer, 
smarter, faster and more convenient. To achieve these goals, ITS provides automatic toll 
collection, traveler information system, intelligent commercial vehicles and intelligent 
traffic control systems. The main goal of ITS program is to enhance safety and comfort on 
roads by exchanging information among cars.
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CHAPTER 2 
CHALLENGES 
VANET is expected to enhance safety so it must be extremely robust and able to 
cope with various unpredictable environmental conditions (high mobility of nodes, 
changing weather, irregular noise, and obstacles). Various conditions pose different impact 
on the performance of the wireless communications (the delivery of safety messages). 
Failing to receive safety messages may cause accidents, traffic jam, or violations which 
cost lives and money.  For those reasons many researchers started addressing and analyzing 
the impact of different conditions and their effect on the wireless communications. VANET 
is expected to operate outdoor in mobile environment, where roads’ and environmental 
conditions are constantly changing. Moreover, VANET encompasses highly changeable 
mobility (speed and direction). Here we summarize the main natural (unintentional) factors 
that make VANET uniquely challenging. 
2.1 MOBILITY AND COMMUNICATION 
 Vehicles speed, direction, and density are constantly changing (matter of seconds). 
Vehicles by nature are expected to be mobile at random speed and direction. For instance, 
a vehicle may experience a sudden and hard braking due to a construction zone or an 
accident in a highway road. This introduces a great challenge especially when dealing with 
delivery and latency of safety messages. Hence, regulations recommend and favor 
generating UDP network traffic in VANET (including safety messages). Unlike TCP 
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(delivery can be verified by Acknowledgment -ACK), ACKs are not applicable in 
UDP traffic. In order to enhance safety on roads, the delivery of safety messages must be 
ensured when transmitted. The utilization of UDP to generate safety related messages along 
with the mobility freedom of vehicles nodes (can leave communication range anytime) 
have made VANET a challenging area for researchers and VANET-app developers. 
2.2  ROAD CONDITIONS 
VANET is expected to operate in outdoor environment where vehicles’ mobility 
and the variation in transmission environment (urban, desert, forest and highway) have a 
great impact in the quality of the wireless communications. The quality (power) of wireless 
signals is easily influenced by obstacles in the space (e.g. trees and buildings), weather 
conditions (e.g. snow and rain), and mobility (e.g. speed and direction). Hence, the quality 
of communications need to be verified under irregular extreme various conditions such as 
vehicles density, surrounding obstacles, geographical characteristics and weather changes, 
to evaluate the impact of these conditions on the connectivity and delivery of messages 
delivery. It is infeasible and challenging to test all conditions since one can’t change 
weather to evaluate the network performance when it is snowing or lightening for example. 
Moreover, it is very costly and dangerous to try to replicate real scenarios (e.g. congested 
road), which makes it very challenging to conduct experiments and evaluate results.  
2.3  ENVIRONMENT (NOISE) 
 Wireless communications –in general- can be easily interfered with, depending on 
the environment operating in (outdoor/indoor). Although VANET uses DSRC in 5.9GHz 
spectrum to provide higher noise resilience in outdoor environments, interference can still 
happen due to the increase in number of vehicles (engine and communication noise), 
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weather changes, impact of other wireless devices (cellular, Wi-Fi, …etc). In wireless 
communications, all undesired collected signals are referred to as white noise regardless 
the generating source. Noise degrades the signal quality and strength that carry information 
from the transmitter to the receiver. Communications can be disrupted and may be blocked 
completely in very noisy environment.  The ratio between the desired signal power (Psignal) 
to the surrounding noise power (Pnoise) is called Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) represented 
as follow: 
SNR = Psignal / Pnoise 
 In outdoor environment, there are more various and random processes occur in 
natures that contribute to degrading the signal quality and the network performance. It is 
infeasible and challenging to address all variables that can cause interference, especially 
the ones caused by natural phenomena (heat, snow, rain, …etc.). Also, the impact on the 
signal quality is constantly changing based on the surroundings. 
2.4  SUMMARY 
VANET uses wireless medium as communications means. Thus, it inherits same 
security risks and vulnerabilities of other types of wireless networks. Moreover, deploying 
and operating VANET outdoor adds on extra challenges due to natural characteristics of 
the environment i.e., highly changeable mobility of nodes, surrounding noise, and road 
conditions. Also, various technical factors, including modulations, encoding, frame size, 
data rate CP and unused subcarriers, have a great impact on the communications’ 
performance. The aforementioned challenges have made VANET a hot and challenging 
research field especially in terms of security and quality of service. To achieve the ultimate 
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goal behind proposing VANET (saving lives), the technology must be extremely robust 
and secured to cope with the rapid changes in the environment.
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CHAPTER 3 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE ATTACKS 
 In the previous chapter, we discussed some of the challenges that undermines 
VANET’s ultimate goal of saving lives. We discussed various challenges which impact the 
wireless communications (V2V and V2I). The aforementioned challenges are due natural 
reasons (weather, obstacles, traffic jam, accidents, etc.), cause unintentional interference, 
and their impact can be mitigated. Several researches [21]-[23] have discussed the various 
unintentional environmental-phenomena and their effect on performance of the 
communications. Additionally, interfering with wireless communications can be 
considered not only a challenge but rather a threat when caused intentionally. Radio 
frequency interference attacks in VANET are not addressable through conventional 
security mechanisms. The high and freedom mobility along with operating outdoor makes 
detecting intentional interference a hard research problem. Simply, an attacker can 
disregard the protocols defining the medium access and continuously transmit RF signals 
to disrupt, block, or interfere with the normal operation of the wireless communications. 
This kind of attacks is referred to as jamming attacks. Many jamming attacks models were 
proposed as well as algorithms that solves the jamming problem in different wireless 
networks. However, applying same the methods to solve intentional jamming in vehicular 
networks is not feasible due the characteristics of the environment and communicating 
nodes. In this chapter, we give details about the jamming attacks’ operations, behaviors 
and their effect on the communication when targeting outdoor-VANETs.
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3.1 OVERVIEW & RELATED WORK 
Jamming style attacks target at interfering and disrupting the wireless 
communications among legitimate nodes that use wireless channels as communications 
medium. Jamming problems have been thoroughly studied by many researchers, military, 
companies, and governments. A common knowledge is that a jammer constantly emits RF 
signals to fill a wireless channel and block communications among legitimate nodes. Xu et 
al. [13] studied the feasibility of launching and detecting jamming attacks in wireless 
networks. They introduced different schemes and behaviors that jammers may adopt to 
launch powerful and more destructive attacks. They modeled several jamming techniques 
in different scenarios using MICA-z wireless motes, and showed how deceptive, random, 
and reactive jamming behaviors can greatly impact the performance of the wireless 
communications and still remain undetectable when applying conventional algorithms to 
detect constant jammers. They also proposed jamming detection and localization 
algorithms based on the consistency between the PDR (Packet Delivery Ratio- which 
defines the network performance) and the observed Signal Strength (SS) measured by 
legitimate wireless nodes. Although their work has been recognized and served as a 
benchmark for most of RF- jamming style attacks’ research, applying the same strategy in 
VANET won’t solve the jamming problem due to high mobility and irregular 
environmental changes. Moreover, jamming effect is not tolerable in VANET since 
jamming attacks block the disseminations and delivery of safety messages. Failure to 
receive early warning messages may cause accidents and deaths. 
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3.2 JAMMING MODELS AND CHARACTERISTICS IN VANET  
VANET is supposed to make roads safer by ensuring proper dissemination and 
delivery of early warning and safety messages among vehicles in outdoor environments. 
Detecting jamming attacks in this kind of environments is challenging task. The attackers’ 
freedom of mobility (stationary or roaming) and operation (jamming or sleep) in 
unpredictable environment contribute to jammers’ goal (remain hidden when launching 
attacks). Detecting jammers becomes even more complicated and challenging depending 
on the adopted jamming behavior when launching the attacks. In this section, we discuss 
the different jammers mobility and behaviors that may be adopted when launching 
jamming attacks in vehicular network environment. 
 3.2.1 JAMMING MOBILITY 
Considering that VANET consists of both stationary (RSUs) and mobile (OBUs) 
nodes, a jammer may target at an RSU, an OBU, or randomly roam around. To model these 
jamming patterns, we consider the following mobility patterns of a jammer. We focus on 
highway roads, and we assume that jammers are interested in remaining undetected. 
• Stationary: A not moving jammer is considered stationary. Such a jammer can be 
sitting in a parked car or at road side while launching attacks targeting stationary 
RSU or OBU vehicles. Jammers of this type can only distress the communications 
effectively where located depending on jamming range. Although jammers of this 
type have full control over choosing the attack location, remaining stationary for an 
extended period of time increases the chances of getting detected. Also, it is 
infeasible to expect attacker to remain stationary in a highway road due to raising 
suspicions.  
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• Targeting mobility: This type of mobile jamming intends to target a specific mobile 
node (vehicle). Targeting-mobile jammers stay in close range to one car to ensure 
the jamming effect throughout the attack period. Depending on the adopted 
jamming model, this type of mobility makes detecting jamming hard especially 
when combined with reactive jamming behavior (introduced in next subsection). 
• Random mobility. Additionally, jammers may launch attacks while driving in their 
cars or motorcycles that keep them mobile without targeting at a chosen target. 
They can exhibit random and high mobility with no constrains depending on their 
mobility means (cars, motorcycles, drones …etc.) 
 3.2.2 JAMMING BEHAVIOR 
In addition to jammers’ mobility, attacker may choose different jamming behaviors 
when launching attacks. Some of these jamming behaviors are more sophisticated than 
others based on the probability of remaining undetected. 
• Constant: A constant jammer sends out random radio signals all the time without 
following any MAC protocols. The objective of this type of behavior is to prevent 
legitimate nodes from accessing communication channels, or corrupt nearby 
packets by emitting high power signals (interference) causing higher bit-error-rate 
(BER) at the receiver and consequently high packet drop rate. The constant jammer 
has full control over when to turn jamming signals on or off. 
• Random: Launching jamming attack that blocks and interferes with communication 
consumes a large amount of energy. To reduce energy consumption, a jammer can 
alternate between sleep mode for tS and jam for tJ seconds. Adopting this technique 
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allows jammers to have more control over energy consumption by altering (tS & tJ) 
as needed. Random jamming operation and effect is similar to constant ones, except 
that the former has more control over the consumed power by alternating between 
jamming and sleeping modes. 
• Reactive: Instead of targeting packets at the sender and prevent their transmission 
without considering channel’s conditions, sophisticated active jammers target at the 
receiver’s side. They constantly listen to the targeted channel, and once a jammer 
senses packets being transmitted, attacker immediately launches jamming attack 
and block packets from being received correctly. This particular jamming behavior 
is challenging to detect due the hidden nature of jamming (jamming signals overlap 
with the packet transmission).  
The combination of the aforementioned behaviors and mobility can produce nine types 
of jammers. Instead of examining all nine, we focus on reactive jammers with all three 
types of mobility patterns. We reason focusing on reactive jamming behavior to their 
hidden nature which makes it hard to detect when present. Also, we believe that any method 
that can detect reactive jammers can identify constant and random jammers. Already in [1], 
authors have studied random and constant jammers in VANET and proposed detection 
algorithm, their method rely on the successful reception of at least one beacon, and are not 
effective against reactive jammers (indistinguishable from congestion scenarios). Thus, 
without loss of generality, we study and validate stationary reactive jammers, targeting 
mobility jammers, and random mobility jammers. 
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3.3  JAMMING EFFECTIVENESS 
When launching a jamming attack, an adversary doesn’t follow any medium access 
control protocols. Jammers can disrupt and completely block nearby communications. 
Depending on the jammer’s position when launching the attack, the whole network in that 
area is affected. Therefore, jamming impact need to be investigated further, especially its 
impact on the operation of an outdoor and highly mobile environment. Xu et al. studied the 
feasibility of launching and detecting jamming attacks in wireless networks [13]. They 
evaluated jamming impact and effectiveness in their work using Berkeley motes. Although 
their algorithm showed promising results, it is infeasible to apply their technique in 
VANET due to unique characteristics of the network (encompass high mobility and volatile 
topology). Thus, we present the three metrics (PDR, PSR, SS) that are widely used to 
evaluate the performance of the network. These metrics are closely related to the network 
performance and are used to identify abnormalities that any wireless network may 
encounter.  
• Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR). The ratio of successful delivered packets to destination 
compared to number of packets that have been sent out by sender. In vehicle network, 
the density of vehicles is highly changeable and dependent on road conditions and the 
time of day. For instance, during rush hours or holidays, roads experience more traffic 
(congestion) which corresponds to observing lower PDR. Also, if a jammer exists, 
packets will suffer from intentional interference causing a significant drop in the PDR. 
Consequently, distinguishing between low PDR caused by congestion or jamming 
attack is impossible by relying on PDR as a single metric. 
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• Packet Send Ratio (PSR). The ratio of packets that are successfully sent out by a 
legitimate source compared to the number of packets it intends to send out in the MAC 
layer. In congested roads, vehicles tend to travel at much lower speed which entitles 
longer communication period between nodes. Consequently, channel observes more 
RTS/CTS (Request/Clear -to send) requests leading to higher drop in PSR. 
Additionally, when jammer presents, the noise introduced by jammer may hold the 
channel status as busy, which leads to an increase in node’s back-off timer and delay 
to receive CTS response. Regardless whether road is congested or jammed, more 
packets will be buffered and discarded upon the arrival of new packets or when they 
timed-out causing low observed PSR. Therefore, it is inadequate to rely on PSR alone 
to identify congested or jammed channel especially in the presence of reactive jammer 
who’s targeting at packets after being sent out. 
• Signal Strength (SS). Is a powerful tool measured at receiver that defines the signal 
quality of the radio frequency signals that carry data from source to destination. Since 
wireless nodes can sample SS during any period of time (depends on the employed 
protocol), many researchers have been utilizing SS to detect jamming attacks in 
different wireless networks. In VANET, vehicles have the freedom to enter and exit 
communications’ range at random speed. As a result, observing high SS may 
correspond to high vehicles intensity (congestion), or jamming attack. Also, in case of 
jammers adopting reactive behavior (stay hidden until packets being transmitted), a 
lower SS maybe observed when measured during the transmission period. Therefore, 
one can’t rely on SS as a standalone metric to distinguish between jamming and 
congestion scenarios. 
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To summarize, we introduced three different mobility patterns and three jamming 
techniques that jammer may adopt when launching attacks. We presented three network 
metrics that have been used to evaluate the performance of any wireless networks. We also 
discussed the deficiency to rely on these metrics (PDR, PSR, and SS) individually to detect 
and distinguish between jamming attack scenarios and congested road ones.
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CHAPTER 4 
DETECTING JAMMING ATTAKS IN 802.11p NETWORKS 
The development of wireless Vehicle Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) aimed to 
enhance road’s safety and provide comfortable driving environment. This goal can be 
achieved by ensuring proper dissemination and reception of early warning and 
infotainment messages. Intentional jamming attack targets at interfering with the normal 
operation of the network by disrupting wireless communications. Since VANET uses 
wireless medium as communication mean in outdoor environment (highly changeable road 
conditions, atmospheric phenomena, and nodes behaviors), estimating the network 
performance is a challenging task. Also, applying conventional methods to monitor, 
analyze and secure the network is infeasible. The combination of various road conditions 
and random mobility of nodes (traveling speed and directions) makes detecting jamming 
attacks a unique problem. Failure to detect jammers poses a threat to people lives and 
economy. Thus, in order to evaluate network performance accurately, and achieve a 
reliable detection of jammers, first we identify the impact of vehicles density on the 
performance of the network in term of signal strength and packet delivery. Then, we study 
jamming effectiveness when adopting different mobility patterns (stationary, random, or 
targeting) and behaviors (constant, random, and reactive). We focus on analyzing jamming 
impact when adopting reactive behavior, and different mobility patterns. Finally, we 
propose a two-phase algorithm to detect the presence of jammers in outdoor mobile 
environment. We evaluate our proposed algorithm in various highway scenarios using 
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simulation. It is worth mentioning that our approach shows promising results to 
detect different types of jammers accurately in IEEE802.11p network.  
4.1 ROAD CONDITIONS ANALYSIS 
Road conditions are unpredictable by nature. Many factors impact the traffic on road 
including but not limited to (vehicles density, obstacles, weather conditions, construction 
zones, traffic lights, and speed limit). Most of these factors tend to be the same when 
analyzing a specific road for a period of time (hours). The density of vehicles on a road 
stands to be the only variable that inclusive rapid change over short period of time (matter 
of seconds or minutes). For instance, road could pack up with cars simply because it is 
rush-hour, work zone or due to accidents. Regardless the cause, the increase in number of 
vehicles in a certain road suggests more communication within that area. Hence, network 
experiences higher throughput in that area. Once reaching certain threshold (close to reach 
the maximum network bandwidth), all communications will be dropped due to network 
congestion. As a result, lower PDR and higher Packet lost rate (PLR) are observed. 
Conducting a real-world experiment is very costly, dangerous, and time consuming. 
Therefore, we consider using NCTUns 6.0 to evaluate the impact of vehicles’ density on 
the performance of the network. It is reasonable to assume that using NCTUns as an 
evaluation tool is sufficient based on a comparison study [24]-[25]. We also studied the 
development of NCTUns 6.0 and how various variables are modeled based on the approved 
802.11p standards to verify the accuracy of our results Appendix A. So, in order to evaluate 
the performance of the network, we constructed a highway road that consists of two lanes 
(common in US), and placed RSU at the edge of the road (to ensure maximum link-time 
between nodes). Each simulation case ran for period of time (the time needed by a car to 
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enter the RSU range until exiting). We define nodes maximum transmission power of 
(28.8dBM) and broadcasting dissemination rate at 10 Basic Safety Messages per second 
(BSM/s). Each BSM was generated as UDP traffic and size of (200-500 bytes) according 
to 802.11p standards [12].  
We start running first case with 1 vehicle which corresponds to vehicle traveling on 
idle interstate (commonly not busy) or at off-peak traffic time (e.g. after mid-night). It is 
worth mentioning that vehicle nodes were defined with collision avoidance behavior rules 
where they can freely accelerate, decelerate, and switch lanes based on road conditions. 
We incremented the number of vehicles (to simulate road traffic under different conditions) 
and observed the impact of various vehicles density on traveling speed, communication 
time, and network performance (in term of PDR, PSR, and SS). Results in Fig.4.1.A shows 
that when vehicle density reaches %52 -around 60 cars/lane- of the roads capacity 
[calculated by dividing road length per lane within RSU range (1000m) over the length of 
average size vehicle (6m)], a noticeable drop in PDR, and PSR occur due to slower 
traveling speed causing longer communications time and more data exchange among 
nodes. We also noticed a slight increase in the measured SS that can be justified as more 
noise (communication, thermal, etc.) generated due to high vehicle density. Additionally, 
when the drop in the PDR reaches more than %45, the measured SS tend to remain almost 
the same. The key observation is the relation between vehicles density, velocity, and flow 
intensity. Thus, we classify road conditions based on the nodes’ density as follow: 
• Normal Period. Represents low density of vehicles traveling at, or close to, the 
posted speed limit on that road. During this period, vehicles experience reliable 
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communication links within RSU range until exiting. This period tends to be 
insignificance to the attacker interest due to the low number of cars. 
• Rush-Hour Period. Vehicles are forced to travel at much lower speed when vehicle 
density exceeds a certain threshold. Nodes tend to observe much lower PDR and 
PSR which correspond to higher lost packet rate than in normal period Fig.4.1. 
Therefore, ensuring reliable delivery of safety messages is essential during this 
period. Failure to receive sensitive data may result drivers to fail to slow, reroute, 
or stop in timely manner to avoid crashes.  
• Incident Period. When number of vehicles is high and close to the capacity of the 
road, vehicles experience what’s called a traffic jam (hours of non-moving or stop-
and-go traffic). This tends to be the most favorable and effective period for jammers 
to launch their attack and remain undetected. The significance of this period is the 
tight relation between vehicles density and the probability of incidents to occur 
(high density corresponds to high probability of accident to occur). 
4.2 DETECTION ALGORITHM 
In this section, we propose a two-phase algorithm: (i) Initialization and (ii) Detection, 
to detect jammers based on the consistency between SS and Packet Delivery/Send Ratio 
(PDSR). Since road conditions vary from road to another, we consider vehicles density on 
road to serve as dynamic variable that correspond to the various conditions on roads. 
• Initialization Phase –Ip. This phase may be conducted during a guaranteed time 
of non-interfered network operation (easily achieved by monitoring SS distribution 
over initialization time period (Tipt), or equipping RSU with SS meter to filter out 
any amplified or unwanted measurements). Also, Initialization Phase (Ip) must be 
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conducted when vehicles’ density is relatively high, i.e. rush-hour, which easy to 
find depending on the road that RSU being deployed at. During this phase, RSU 
will calculate and collect (PDSR, SS, PLR) Packet-delivery/send-ratio, signal 
strength and packet lost rate in a table for Tipt. Once the initialization period timer 
Tipt expires, RSU will find upper bound (SS) value that would have produced a 
particular PDSR in non-jammed-rush-hour scenario [PDSRj, Max(SSj)]. After 
forming the table, RSU will assign two threshold values γPDSR and γPLR, the 
maximum PDSRj and the minimum PLRj respectively, calculated during (Tipt). 
Then a simple regression will be conducted to build a relation between (PDSR, SS) 
values for all (PDSRx) that have not been observed and are less than the set 
threshold (γPDSR). Finally, each RSU node will calculate and set periodic monitoring 
timer (Twind) by calculating the needed time by a car to enter and exit that RSU 
range denoted [TCap= road length within RSU range(LoR) over the posted speed 
limit on road(SLoR) ]. Upon the completion of this phase, each RSU will have a 
table contains an upper bound SS value to produce a particular PDSR, a periodic 
monitor window (Twind), and two thresholds (γPDSR, γPLR) Table 4.1. It is worth 
mentioning, the collected data including thresholds will vary from one RSU to 
another depending on the roads that been deployed on. 
• Detection Phase with consistency check. RSU will monitor (PDSR, SS) and 
calculate PLR every time window (WPLR). When the observed PDSR and PLR 
exceed γPDSR and γPLR set during Ip, a consistency check is performed 
C_Check(Max(PDSR), SS) to check whether the low observed PDSR is consistent 
with the measured SS. The C_Check function, Table 4.3, takes an input 
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(Max(PDSR), SS) as pair and check whether the measured SS is consistent with the 
observed PDSR by checking the (PDSRIp, SSIp) table generated during the 
initialization period. The Boolean C_Check return decides whether the low 
observed PDSR is due jamming attack, or a typical congested road. The detector 
will also return “normal state” when Twind runs out with no abnormalities Table 4.2. 
Table.4.1: Jamming Detection Algorithm [Initialization Phase] 
 Algorithm 1: [Initialization phase] 
 Input: Tip, LoR,SLoR 
 Output: (PDSRj, SSj), (PDSRx, SSx), γPDSR, γPLR, Twind, WPLR 
1 for (j=1, j<= Tip, j++) do 
2 | Sum = 0 
3 | for (i = j-1 → i=j) do 
4 | | Data[i] = (PDRi, PSRi, SSi, PLRi) 
5 | | Sum = Sum++ 
6 | end 
7 | PDSRj = (∑ PDRi + ∑PSRi) / 2Sum 
8 | SSj = {SSi, SSi+1, SSi+2, …} 
9 | PLRj = Average (PLRi) 
10 | Data[j] = (PDSRj, SSj, PLRj) 
11 end 
12 TCap = LoR/ SLoR, WPLR, T(PLRj), Twind = TCap/WPLR 
13 γPDSR = Max(PDSRj | PDSRj ϵ Data[j]) 
14 γPLR = Min(PLRj | PLRj ϵ Data[j]) 
15 foreach PDSRj ϵ Data[j] 
16 | 
| 
Find upper bound MAX(SSi) ϵ SSj that would 
     produce (PDSRj) 
17 end 
18 foreach PDSRx ∉Data[j], and PDSRx < γPDSR do 
19 | 
| 
Conduct simple regression to build a relation 
      between (PDSRx, SSx) 
20 | Data[x] = (PDSRx, SSx) 
21 end 
22 return (γPDSR, γPLR, Twind, WPLR, Data[j], Data[x]) 
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Table.4.2: Jamming Detection Algorithm [Detection Phase] 
 Algorithm 2: [Detection phase] 
 Input: γPDSR, γPLR, Twind, WPLR 
 Output: State 
1 Initialize: Counter = 0, State = NORMAL 
2 While (Counter < Size[Twind]) do 
3 | Counter++ 
4 | for each WPLR  do 
5 |  | Calculate ( PDSRJ, SSj, PLRj) 
6 |  | if (PLRj  > γPLR) && (PDSRj < γPDSR) then 
7 |  |        |      if C_Check(MaxPDSRj, SSj) == True then  
8 |  |        |       |   Counter = 0 
9 |  |        |       |   State = (CONGESTED) 
10 |  |        |     else 
11 |  |        |        |   Counter = 0 
12 |           |       |        |   State = (JAMMED) 
13 |           |       |     end 
14 |           |      end 
15 |           |      return (State) 
16 |           |     State = (NORMAL) 
17 |  end 
18 end 
19 return (State) 
 
4.3 EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATIONS 
In order to evaluate our algorithm, we simulate a two-lane highway road of 1000 meter 
length (maximum RSU range) with different vehicle density (1-100 OBUs). We define 
same parameters mentioned in section4.1. [refer to Appendix B for details] We considered 
free space and shadowing propagation model which is more appropriate when simulating 
outdoor environment. Observations from simulators’ results are summarized as follow. 
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• In Non-Attacker cases, we observed a significant drop in network performance 
when vehicles occupied more than %52 of the maximum road capacity. Thus, we 
assign this value (52%) as vehicle density threshold (approx. 60 cars) that  
Table.4.3: Jamming Detection Algorithm [Consistency Check] 
 Algorithm 3: Consistency_Check() 
 Input: γPDSR, γPLR, Twind, WPLR 
 Output: State 
1 Initialize: Counter = 0, State = NORMAL 
2 While (Counter < Size[Twind]) do 
3 | Counter++ 
4 | for each WPLR  do 
5 |  | Calculate ( PDSRJ, SSj, PLRj) 
6 |  | if (PLRj  > γPLR) && (PDSRj < γPDSR) then 
7 |  |        |      if C_Check(MaxPDSRj, SSj) == True then  
8 |  |        |       |   Counter = 0 
9 |  |        |       |   State = (CONGESTED) 
10 |  |        |     else 
11 |  |        |        |   Counter = 0 
12 |          |        |        |   State = (JAMMED) 
13 |          |        |     end 
14 |          |      end 
15 |          |      return (State) 
16 |          |     State = (NORMAL) 
17 |  end 
18 end 
19 return (State) 
• corresponds to the road’s conditions during rush hour (congested road) to run the 
Initialization phase -Ip. After running experiments and collecting data, we plotted 
our results shown in Fig.4.1.B with trend-line corresponding to threshold calculated 
during Ip. 
• For Attacker scenarios, we implemented reactive jammer with multi-mobility 
capabilities (stationary, random, and targeting) and defined the mobility to follow 
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the posted speed limit on road when possible (i.e. clear lane). Also, we defined 
fixed jamming power of 44dbm (such a device can be obtained for less than $200).  
Results Figur.4.1.C shows a strong tie between jammers’ impact (depending on its 
location) on the measured SS, and the correspondent packet lost rate. In low vehicle 
density, our algorithm detected jammers when its location is close enough to affect the 
transmission/delivery of packets. Also, in targeting mobility jamming case, some packets 
still got delivered correctly depending on the targeted node location and RSU. 
Additionally, when vehicle density reaches the congestion threshold, RSU detected jammer 
efficiently once nodes failed to receive sufficient communications based on vehicle density 
on road. Looking at Fig.4.1, one can clearly see the relation between the observed SS and 
PDSR in the present and absence of jammers. 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
VANET, which is based on inserting wireless access in vehicle environments, are 
becoming reality and being deployed to enhance safety and provide a variety of services. 
Although VANET’s main goal is to enhance safety and comfort on roads, intentional 
jamming aims to undermine such a goal by interfering with the wireless communications. 
Therefore, understanding the nature of jamming attacks in vehicle environment is critical 
to ensure the proper operation of the wireless network. This paper has sought to focus on 
investigating jamming mobility and behaviors in highway roads. We have presented three 
different jamming behaviors and three mobility patterns that jammer can adopt when 
launching attacks. We then studied reactive jamming impact, adopting various mobility 
patterns (stationary, random, or targeting), in different road conditions. We showed 
jamming effect on PDSR and SS causing failure to receive safety messages. We then 
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proposed a solution to detect jammers based on road conditions in which RSUs are 
deployed at. Our algorithm proved its effectiveness by achieving high detection accuracy 
in different vehicle density scenarios. 
4.5 SUMMARY 
The development of wireless VANET aimed to enhance road's safety and provide 
comfortable driving environment. This goal can be achieved by ensuring proper 
dissemination and reception of early warning and infotainment messages. Intentional 
jamming attack targets at interfering with the normal operation of the network by disrupting 
wireless communications. Since VANET uses wireless medium as communication mean 
and performs in outdoor environment (highly changeable road conditions, atmospheric 
phenomena, and nodes behaviors), estimating the network performance is a challenging 
task. Due to the nature of VANET, encompasses high mobility of vehicles and volatile 
topology, applying conventional methods to monitor, analyze and secure the network is 
infeasible. Thus, we provide this work which focuses jamming mobility and behaviors in 
IEEE802.11p networks. We focus on analyzing jamming impact, adopting reactive 
behaviors and different mobility patterns. The combination of various road conditions and 
random mobility of nodes (traveling speed and directions) makes detecting jamming 
attacks a challenging task. Thus, to achieve reliable detection, first we identified the impact 
of vehicles density on the network performance. Then, we studied jamming effectiveness 
when adopting different mobility patterns (stationary, random, or targeting) and behaviors 
(constant, random, and reactive). Our three main contributions are, i) Presenting rich 
contents and details regarding the new technology DSRC and the 802.11p standards, ii) 
Provide a full understanding of jamming attacks, threats, and capabilities especially when 
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dealing with outdoor wireless networks, and iii) Detecting intentional interference attacks 
targeting at disrupting the normal operation of IEEE802.11p networks 
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Figure.4.1: Result PDSR and SS A) Initialization Phase of 60 cars. B) Normal scenario 1-80 cars. And C) Attacker Scenario 1-80 cars 
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CHAPTER 5 
JAMMING DETECTION – SIMULATION & ANALYSIS 
Problem Description & contributions: 
1- DSRC uses CCH and SCH. We focus on studying the CCH (Ch178). 
2- Study the feasibility to launch jamming attack by transmitting at high fixed power 
(Constantly or reactively) causing failure to receive packets at the receiver side and 
consequently a drop in PDR. 
3- Proposing a detection algorithm to detect jammers targeting DSRC (dedicated short 
range communication) in a vehicle network. 
WAVE Standards: 
1 Nodes: Cars (OBU) + Infrastructure (RSU) introducing V2V and V2X 
communications with 28.8dBm Max. output power. 
2 Channels: 1 Control Channel (Ch 178) with 10 MHz bandwidth and data rate 
6Mbps, and 6 Service channels with 10 MHz bandwidth (20Mhz optional) and data 
rate (3-27Mbps) 
3 Channel Access: Control Channel, Service channel, and Guard (5 MHz) – intervals 
(CCHI, SCHI, GI) was introduced where CCHI and SCHI are roughly = 50µs each, 
and GI = 1.6 µs (microsecond) as recommended by 1609.4 standards.
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4 Messages: Nodes should be able to exchange safety messages on the control 
channel depending on the incident. The Society of automotive engineers (SAE)- 
DSRC Tech. Committee  has defined in the standards (SAE-J2735) dissemination 
messages rate at 10 messages/s. They also defined the safety messages size to be 
(200-500) byte including authentication overhead. 
Measurements:  
1- BSM: Basic safety messages that is periodically broadcasted to surrounding 
vehicles. 
2- Message Rate: We use the suggested rate of 10 messages per second to broadcast 
event (safety Msg.) 
3- Packet Size: max. reasonable packet size is used (500 byte) for each BSM. 
4- PDR: We use packet delivery ratio at the receiver in this analysis. (delivered 
packets over sent packets) 
5- PSR: We use packet sent ratio at sender in this analysis. (sent packets over intended 
to send) 
6- PDSR: This is a new proposed measurement that we will use to evaluate the 
network behavior. It is intuitive that when Constant jammer exists both PSR and 
PDR will drop which correspond to low PDSR. On the other hand Reactive jammer 
will only impact the PDR and hence it is a promising measurement to use to 
distinguish between different types of jammers. 
7- RSSI: We obtain RSSI at the receiver when receiving BSM. 
8- SNR: We obtain the signal-to-noise ratio measured at the receiver upon receiving 
BSM. 
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9- BER: Bit error rate is obtained at the receiver after decoding the received signals. 
10- Throughput: throughput will be used to measure data-flow in channel at all time in 
Kbps. 
Cases: In our work we study 2 main cases, normal and attacker. There are many sub-cases 
that correspond to the real-life scenarios. We categorize our study cases and sub-cases as 
follow: 
1- Normal cases: 
a. Where vehicle density within 1 RSU range is low enough to produce high 
PDSR (
𝑷𝑺𝑹
𝟐
+
𝑷𝑫𝑹
𝟐
). 
b. Where vehicle density is high due to congestion and the PDSR will be 
investigated based on the maximum road’s capacity of vehicles depending 
on the number of lanes. 
Notes: In these cases, we will simulate several scenarios to mimic (interstate 
and urban) scenarios. Also, nodes density will be tested to find the capacity 
threshold to ensure the delivery of BSM. 
2- Attacker cases: 
a. Attacker is active while vehicle density within 1 RSU range is low. 
b. Attacker is active while vehicle density is high due to congestion (incident). 
Notes: 2 types of attackers will be implemented (constant and reactive) with 
different mobility behaviors (stationary and mobile). 
 39 
 
Performance Analysis (Non Attacker-Highway) scenario: We perform intensive 
simulations with different node’s density to find the node’s density threshold that cause 
high packets drop rate. 
Road capacity: in order to build our cases realistically we need to investigate the maximum 
number of vehicles that can occupy 1 lane in a road. It is worth to mention that we don’t 
consider large vehicles (Trailers, Busses, and semi-trucks), instead we assume that all 
vehicles are regular size cars. The validity of our assumption is based on the more vehicles 
occupying roads, the more likely to have congestions. In order to estimate the maximum 
number of vehicles per lane, we assume that RSU have the maximum communication range 
up to (1000m) in diameter. Depending on the distance between the RSU and the road we 
can measure the maximum communication range by drawing a circle around the RSU. 
Let’s assume that RSU can communicate with nodes up to 1000 meter. Therefore the radius 
of the RSU communication range is 500 denoted (r). If the angle (n) formed by RSU and 
road, then the segment area of road that within RSU communication range can be 
calculated as: 
1 lane Road Segment Area within RSU range = (r2\2) [n (π/180) – sin (n)]  
Where:  
n is the central angle in DEGREES 
r  radius of the circle of which the segment is a part. 
π is Pi, approximately 3.142 
sin is the trigonometry Sine function 
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Hence, we can calculate maximum node capacity by dividing the calculated segment over 
vehicle node dimension. (Average 4meter length x 2 meter width –Full size cars) we add 
4 meters in length to compensate for space required between cars in front and behind (since 
stacking cars bumper to bumper is not feasible). Hence an average dimension for cars 
(excluding trucks and irregular car sizes) should occupy an area of 12 m2. Therefore, the 
maximum road capacity of vehicles within RSU range will be: 
Max Capacity = (r2\2) [ n(π/180)-sin n] / [(L+S)*W] 
We assume that RSU is sitting at the edge of the road for simplicity, then the value of n 
(the angle between RSU and the edge of the road on both sides of that RSU is 180o. Hence 
the maximum number of vehicles that can occupy one lane within an RSU range of 
(1000m) will be: 
   = approximately 110 regular size vehicles. 
Alternatively, we use a simpler technique that is based on the road length (1000m) and 
divide that over the average length of vehicles (6 m). We also add 4 m to the vehicle’s 
length to compensate for the safe distance behind and in-front of vehicles as follow: 
Road to vehicles capacity = 1000 / [ 6+4] 
We use the value (100 as the upper bound) to correspond to the maximum road’s capacity 
of vehicles. when evaluating the network behavior in the simulator platform. 
Propagation model: We use free space and shadowing propagation model since in a real 
world RSU may be deployed in an area where there exist LoS between RSU and vehicles. 
L: vehicle length. 
S: space between nodes. 
W: cars width. 
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Fading model: 2 fading models were investigated (raician and rayligh). Due to the 
possibility of LoS existence between nodes we use Raician model in our simulations since 
Rician fading occurs when one of the paths, typically a LoS, is much stronger than the 
others. 
Simulation time: Due to the numerous numbers of cases and scenarios that we will 
simulate, we need to carefully choose simulation time that will be large enough to collect 
necessary data and short enough to avoid unnecessary processing and resources usage. 
Hence, we investigate the simulation time that we need for that matter. Let’s assume cars 
travelling in an interstate (speed [45-80mph]). Hence in order to capture communications 
data between nodes and RSU (when entering, driving, and exiting RSU communication 
range), we define our simulation time to be the time that is needed for high speed vehicles 
to enter and exit RSU communication range. Hence the simulation time can be calculated 
as follow: 
 Simulation time = RSU max communication range / vehicles maximum speed 
   = 1000m / 80Mph   = 1000m / 35 mps = 28.5 seconds 
Therefore, we use 30 seconds to be our simulation time to compensate for vehicles entering 
and exiting RSU communication range, and save computer resources during simulations. 
Link availability time: Based on current study, link availability in mobile network depends 
entirely (in general) on the distance between sender and receiver. So we consider the link 
availability between nodes based on the distance between node and RSU. Hence we can 
define the link availability between RSU and any vehicle node to be AVAILABLE_Link 
for time (t in seconds) where t is the time from car node enter RSU communication range 
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until existing RSU range (which is a function of car speed and the distance between RSU 
and car node).  
Simulation Parameters: 
The table below summarizes our general simulation parameters: 
Table 5.1: Simulation Parameters 
Parameter Value Notes 
Simulator NCTUns Release 6.0 
Simulation Time 30 seconds Per simulation case 
Node Type RSU & OBU ----- 
Topology Interstate & Urban ----- 
Minimum number of 
vehicles 
1 ----- 
Maximum Number of 
vehicles 
110 Per lane 
Mobile node speed (45-80) or (20-50) Mph Interstate vs. Urban 
Acceleration, Deceleration Freely Car nodes 
Number of lanes (bi-
direction) 
2 1lane each direction 
Lane width 4 m US regulation 
Channel Type Control Channel ----- 
Channel Number 178 ----- 
Channel Frequency 5.890 GHz 5.885-5.895 Ghz 
Channel spacing 
(bandwidth) 
10 Mhz ----- 
Channel Interval 50 ms ----- 
Propagation Free space and 
shadowing 
----- 
Fading Model Rician ----- 
Data Type BSM Basic Safety Message 
BSM (Packet) size 500 byte 1 BSM per packet 
Communication type Broadcast Bi-directional (V2X) 
RSU-BSM rate 10 messages per second US Standards 
Car-BSM rate 10 messages per second Correspond to incident 
Data rate (CCH) 6 Mbps Standards Recommendation 
(CCH) 
Max. Transmission power 28.8 dbm Standards 
Receiver sensitivity -82 ----- 
Transport layer protocol UDP Standards Recommendation 
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Topology (Interstate): 
 
Figure 5.1:  Highway Topology 
Normal-Case1 (1 RSU + 1 Car) 
In this case, we simulate 1 Car and 1 RSU exchanging 10 BSM/s at 500 byte/BSM 
using broadcasting technique in an interstate topology where car speed is between 45-80 
Mph. Each node (Car or RSU) will be broadcasting 10 messages per second where each 
message is transmitted as UDP packet at size of 500 byte per message. 
Results: after collecting results, we notice the accumulated packets lost are 30 packets out 
of total 300 packets transmitted. I.e. out of the 300 BSM that was sent by RSU, car moving 
at high speed was able to receive 260 messages during driving in that RSU range. 
 
Figure 5.2:  1 OBU and 1 RSU Highway Scenario 
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Normal-Case 2 (1 RSU + 10 Cars): 
In this case, we simulate 10 Cars and 1 RSU exchanging 10 BSM/s at 500 
byte/BSM using broadcasting technique in an interstate topology where cars speed is 
between 45-80 Mph. Each node (Car or RSU) will be broadcasting 10 messages per second 
where each message is transmitted as UDP packet at size of 500 byte per message. 
Results: after collecting results, we notice the accumulated packets lost are 144 packets out 
of total 300 packets transmitted by RSU. 
In other word, out of the 300 BSM (30 unique safety messages) that was sent by 
RSU, car moving at high speed was able to receive 156 messages during driving in that 
RSU range. We also note that Cars will still receive all the messages that RSU transmitted 
even though the presence of 9 more vehicles travelling on the same route resulted on higher 
packets loss.  
 
Figure 5.3:  10 OBUs and 1 RSU Highway Scenario 
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Normal-Case 3 (1 RSU + 20 Cars): 
In this case, we simulate 20 Cars and 1 RSU exchanging 10 BSM/s at 500 
byte/BSM using broadcasting technique in an interstate topology where cars speed is 
between 45-80 Mph. Each node (Car or RSU) will be broadcasting 10 messages per second 
where each message is transmitted as UDP packet at size of 500 byte per message. 
Results: after collecting results, we notice the accumulated packets lost are 155 packets out 
of total 300 packets transmitted by RSU. 
In other word, out of the 300 BSM (30 unique safety messages) that was sent by 
RSU, car moving at high speed was able to receive 145 messages during driving in that 
RSU range. We also note that Cars were still able to receive more than 1BSM/sec RSU 
transmitted even though the presence of 19 more vehicles travelling on the same route 
resulted on higher packets loss.  
 
Figure 5.4:  20 OBUs and 1 RSU Highway Scenario 
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Normal-Case 4 (1 RSU + 40 Cars): 
In this case, we simulate 40 Cars and 1 RSU exchanging 10 BSM/s at 500 
byte/BSM using broadcasting technique in an interstate topology where cars speed is 
between 45-80 Mph. Each node (Car or RSU) will be broadcasting 10 messages per second 
where each message is transmitted as UDP packet at size of 500 byte per message. 
Results: after collecting results, we notice the accumulated packets lost are 183 packets out 
of total 300 packets transmitted by RSU. 
In other word, out of the 300 BSM (30 unique safety messages) that was sent by 
RSU, car moving at high speed was able to receive 117 messages during driving in that 
RSU range. We also note that Cars (overall) were still able to receive more than 
1BSM/second that RSU transmitted even though the presence of 39 more vehicles 
travelling on the same route resulted on higher packets loss.  
 
Figure 5.5:  40 OBUs and 1 RSU Highway Scenario 
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Normal-Case 5 (1 RSU + 60 Cars): 
In this case, we simulate 60 Cars and 1 RSU exchanging 10 BSM/s at 500 
byte/BSM using broadcasting technique in an interstate topology where cars speed is 
between 45-80 Mph. Each node (Car or RSU) will be broadcasting 10 messages per second 
where each message is transmitted as UDP packet at size of 500 byte per message. 
Results: after collecting results, we notice the accumulated packets lost are 197 packets out 
of total 300 packets transmitted by RSU. 
In other word, out of the 300 BSM (30 unique safety messages) that was sent by 
RSU, car moving at high speed was able to receive 103 messages during driving in that 
RSU range. We also note that Cars still were able to receive all the messages that RSU 
transmitted even though the presence of 59 more vehicles travelling on the same route 
resulted on higher packets loss.  
 
Figure 5.6:  60 OBUs and 1 RSU Highway Scenario 
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Normal-Case 6 (1 RSU + 80 Cars): 
In this case, we simulate 80 Cars and 1 RSU exchanging 10 BSM/s at 500 
byte/BSM using broadcasting technique in an interstate topology where cars speed is 
between 45-80 Mph. Each node (Car or RSU) will be broadcasting 10 messages per second 
where each message is transmitted as UDP packet at size of 500 byte per message. 
Results: after collecting results, we notice the accumulated packets lost are 215 packets out 
of total 300 packets transmitted by RSU. 
Conclusion: In other word, out of the 300 BSM (30 unique safety messages) that was sent 
by RSU, car moving at high speed was able to receive 85 messages during driving in that 
RSU range. We also note that Cars still were able to receive all the messages (at least 1 
BSM/s) that RSU transmitted even though the presence of 79 more vehicles travelling on 
the same route resulted on higher packets loss.  
Normal-Case 7 (1 RSU + 100 Cars): 
In this case, we simulate 100 Cars and 1 RSU exchanging 10 BSM/s at 500 
byte/BSM using broadcasting technique in an interstate topology where cars speed is 
between 45-80 Mph. Each node (Car or RSU) will be broadcasting 10 messages per second 
where each message is transmitted as UDP packet at size of 500 byte per message. 
Results: after collecting results, we notice the accumulated packets lost are 247 packets out 
of total 300 packets transmitted by RSU. 
Conclusion: In other words, out of the 300 BSM (30 unique safety messages) that was sent 
by RSU, car moving at high speed was able to receive 53 messages during driving in that 
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RSU range (only 24 unique BSMs were received). We also note that when nodes density 
reaches 100 nodes within 1 RSU range, the channel bandwidth is unable to sustain nodes 
congestions and hence safety messages will be lost.  
 
Figure 5.7:  100 OBUs and 1 RSU Highway Scenario 
Further Notes: 
We noticed that most of packets got lost due to the impact of node’s density on 
RSU communication (hearing) range. In other words, the higher cars density within RSU 
range, the higher attenuation occurs in nodes hearing range within that area due to the 
increase in the noise power. Also, in an area where nodes density is high, the probability 
of packets to collide is high which explain the drastic drop in packet delivery ratio. We 
notice that there exist a tight relationship between RSU’s and cars communication range, 
and vehicles density within that area at time t. In other words, there is a tradeoff between 
the number of vehicles in any section of the road and the communication range of all nodes 
existed in that area. So, we relate the increase of packet loss to the increase of cars density 
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within an RSU range which impact communication range and the collision probability 
between packets. 
We also noticed that in highway scenarios when nodes density increases the cars 
speed decreases and hence the link-availability-duration increase because cars will spend 
longer time within the RSU range. Although this should increase the probability for 
vehicles to receive messages correctly however, depending on the number of vehicles that 
may exist during congestion, communication overhead may occur consequently causing 
attenuation to communication range between nodes. 
RSU Deployment Location: 
In our analysis we discussed how nodes density affects the number of dropped 
packets. Hence, we propose placing RSU in away to have a maximum node’s density of 
no more than 90 nodes per lane (to ensure the delivery of at least 1 BSM/s).  
Recall the formula which calculates the maximum number of vehicles that can 
occupy 1 lane. 
Max Capacity\ 1 lane = (r2\2) [ n(π/180)-sin n] / [(L+S)*W] 
Then we can use it to find the best location to deploy RSUs based on their distance from 
road as follow: 
90 = 125000 [ n(π)/180) – Sin n] / [L+S) * W 
90 = 500 [ n (π) / 180 – Sin n] / 12 
n (π) – Sin n = approx. 400 meter between RSUs when deploy 
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Hence, RSU (with high vehicles density within its communication range) can 
communicate up to approximately 400* 2 = 800 meter if it was sitting at the edge of the 
road.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 20 OBUs + 1 RSU (non-attacker): 
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60 OBU + 1 RSU (non-attacker) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9: 60 OBUs + 1 RSU (non-attacker) 
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100 OBU + 1 RSU (non-attacker) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10:100 OBUs + 1 RSU (non-attacker) 
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
-100-90-80-70-60-50-40
RSU-PDSR Vs. RSS
PDSR Vs RSS
Received power
0
20
40
60
80
100
-100.00-90.00-80.00-70.00-60.00-50.00-40.00
Car-PDSR Vs. RSS
Car-PDSR Vs. RSS
Received power
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00 30.00 35.00
RSU- RSS over Time
RSU- RSS
Time in Sec
  
5
4
 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Reactive jammer impact on exchanging BSMs  
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Figure 5.12: Sample Data after cleaning 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF LONG-RANGE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS 
CAPABILITIES AMONG MULTIPLE AUTONOMOUS SURFACE VEHICLES (ASVS) 
The rapid advancement in sensor modalities enabled a fleet of robots to carry their 
missions autonomously and efficiently and by maintaining reliable communications among 
them and base-stations [58]. Although robots nowadays are more sophisticated in term of 
exploring capability (drive, fly, and dive autonomously) based on sensory data, monitoring 
exploring robots during A mission is crucial to minimize potential loss (fatality or 
financially). Hence, it is essential to provide low latency, reliable, and robust 
communication channels to ensure a continuous and effective monitoring of autonomous 
robots during missions. The desirable communication range along with the number of 
communicating nodes, are the key factors that define the frequency band (VHF, UHF, SHF, 
etc.) To be used in the radio spectrum for communications.  Nevertheless, several other 
factors contribute to degrading the quality of communications, such as, but not limited to, 
environmental noise and weather outdoor, and walls and obstacles indoor. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE, AND MOTIVATIONS. 
Several works investigated the wireless communications among a fleet of autonomous 
vehicles and provided a rich analysis in different communication bands of the rf spectrum. 
Hayat et al. [59] demonstrated in their work the feasibility of maintaining links between 
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multiple drones and base station in single/multi-hop manner. Although their work showed 
promising results by adopting the wi-fi band for communications (802.11N, ac), 
communicating in wi-fi band is limited in range up to a couple of hundred meters [60]. 
Also, Morgenthaler et al. Developed the UAVNET prototype that forms a flying wireless 
mesh network [61]. Results showed 6.3 times higher throughput in flying wireless mesh 
nodes than a ground-based network approach. 
 
Figure. 6.1: Jetyaks equipped with RFD900+ modems 
This chapter presents a performance evaluation that can be used as a guide to 
understand the capability and reliability of long range communications. Such a study can 
then be used to better design a network for a team of multiple robots in marine 
environments, where long range distance communication is necessary. We present the 
different configurations that can be setup and their impacts on communications in a mobile 
environment. We focus on communicating in the ism band (900MHz) when experimenting 
indoor and outdoor. We use cheap, off the Shelf radio frequency (rf) modems – open source 
RFD900+ (widely used for peer-to-peer telemetry communications). Several indoor and 
outdoor experiments show the quality of the communications in terms of latency, range, 
and the impact on data rate and RSSI value (received signal strength indicator). It is worth 
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mentioning that our motive behind adopting 900 MHz is the low-cost/weight of the 
hardware, and the potential to cover longer ranges with better penetration through obstacles 
than higher frequencies. Due to limited space when running indoor experiments, we 
assume stationary robots. More significantly, outdoor experiments were conducted by 
mounting rfd900+ hardware on a fleet of autonomous surface vehicles (ASV) masts; see 
fig.6.1. We present multiple setup scenarios and discussions regarding the radio 
configuration and results. We start by evaluating the communication between one base 
station and one mobile robot. Results show that we can maintain robust link between the 
Jetyaks and bs (base-station). We then add another bs to simulate multiple BSs monitoring 
the same Jetyak. Several other key-experiments were performed with multiple Jetyaks 
communicating with multiple BSs forming a mesh-like network. Observations and analysis 
are discussed related to evaluating communication links between multiple Jetyaks and BSs. 
Fig. 6.2 shows a deployment in the Congaree river in South Carolina with four Jetyaks, 
where the communication quality was experimentally evaluated fig. 6.3. The main 
contribution is to give an insight of the different setups that can be easily adopted when 
monitoring autonomous vehicles over a long range (over 10 miles) using basic hardware 
and how to optimize and tune parameters to achieve higher throughput and range. Future 
work will consider the construction of a communication map [62] in order to control the 
ASVs facilitating a communication link to the ground control station while Exploring areas 
larger than the communication ranges [63]. 
6.2 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND CASE-STUDIES 
We conducted multiple experiments indoors and outdoors using RFD900+ radio 
modem fig 6.4 to evaluate the quality of communications of 900MHz band. We also ran 
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multiple scenarios for each experiment where two nodes were communicating with each 
other as a base station and remote node. We then added another remote node to analyze the 
impact on the quality of communications. All indoor experiments were run in the Horizon 
II building were base station was installed in one room in the first floor (#1215) and remote 
node in another room (#1205). The distance between the two rooms were at least 150 ft. 
with, multiple walls exist in between (more than 8 walls) to test the penetration strength of 
the signal. Table 6.1 shows the various parameters that can be configured when setting up 
nodes for communications. On the other hand, all outdoor experiments were conducted on 
either Lake Murray or the Congaree river where Jetyaks were either controlled by a 
transmitter or an actual personnel riding in them. Fig 5.5 shows the preparation for one of 
the outdoor experiment on the Congaree River. 
  
Figure 6.2: GPS traces of four ASVs during deployment at the Congaree River 
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Figure 6.3: RSSI and Noise Vs. Time for local and remote nodes 
 
 
Figure 6.4: RFD900+ Radio Modem as BS 
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Table 6.1: RFD900+ configurable parameters and their meaning 
Parameter Description Default Max Min 
Format EEPROM Version --- --- --- 
Serial Speed In one byte form 57 115 2 
Air Speed Data rate in one byte 64 250 2 
Net ID Network ID 25 499 0 
Tx Power In dBm 20 30 0 
ECC Error Correcting Code 0 1 0 
Mavlink Mavlink Framing & Reporting 0 1 0 
Op Resend Opportunic Resend 0 1 0 
Min Freq In KHz 915,000 927,000 902,000 
Max Freq In KHz 9228,000 928,000 903,000 
Num Channel Frequency hopping channels 20 50 5 
Duty Cycle Percentage of time to transmit 100 100 10 
LBT Rssi Listen before talk 0 1 0 
Manchester Manchester encoding 0 1 0 
RTS CTS Ready / Clear to send 0 1 0 
Node ID Unique ID for each node 2 29 0 
Node Dest Remote ID to communicate with 65535 29 0 
Sync Any Broadcast feature 0 1 0 
Node Count Total number of nodes 2 30 2 
6.3 EVALUATION AND RESULTS 
We focus on showing results for point-to-point and multipoint communications in 
outdoor experiments since our motive behind this work is to analyze the communications 
among a fleet of ASVs. 
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Figure 6.5: Preparation and setting up for outdoor Experiments 
6.3.1 Point-to-Point 
We were able to achieve robust and reliable communications between the two 
Jetyaks with data rate up to 250 kps with no issues. Below we show the optimal 
configuration that we used when running experiments.
[0] S0: FORMAT=27 
[0] S1: SERIAL_SPEED=57 
[0] S2: AIR_SPEED=250 
[0] S3: NETID=36 
[0] S4: TXPOWER=30 
[0] S5: ECC=0 
[0] S6: MAVLINK=1 
[0] S7: OPPRESEND=0 
[0] S8: MIN_FREQ=915000 
[0] S9: MAX_FREQ=928000 
[0] S10: NUM_CHANNELS=50 
[0] S11: DUTY_CYCLE=50 
[0] S12: LBT_RSSI=0 
[0] S13: MANCHESTER=0 
[0] S14: RTSCTS=0 
[0] S15: NODEID=0 
[0] S16: NODEDESTINATION=1 
[0] S17: SYNCANY=0 
[0] S18: NODECOUNT=2 
[1] S0: FORMAT=27 
[1] S1: SERIAL_SPEED=57 
[1] S2: AIR_SPEED=250 
[1] S3: NETID=36 
[1] S4: TXPOWER=30 
[1] S5: ECC=0 
[1] S6: MAVLINK=1 
[1] S7: OPPRESEND=0 
[1] S8: MIN_FREQ=915000 
[1] S9: MAX_FREQ=928000 
[1] S10: NUM_CHANNELS=50 
[1] S11: DUTY_CYCLE=100 
[1] S12: LBT_RSSI=0 
[1] S13: MANCHESTER=0 
[1] S14: RTSCTS=0 
[1] S15: NODEID=1 
[1] S16: NODEDESTINATION=0 
[1] S17: SYNCANY=0 
[1] S18: NODECOUNT=2 
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In figure 6.6, we show RSSI and noise for both remote and local nodes that 
correspond to the same experiment. It is worth mentioning that we were able to achieve 
over 15 miles of robust communication on the river between base station and one surfing 
Jetyak. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 : RSSI and Noise results values in Point-to-Point scenarios 
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6.3.2 Multipoint (3-way) 
We setup one base-station and two remote nodes (Jetyaks) to evaluate a three-way 
communication. Upon adding another Jetyak to serve as an extra remote node, we notice 
that communications get sluggish and drop pretty quickly (within few meters) when using 
same exact configurations introduced in the previous point-to-point scenarios. Several 
configurations were tested to find the optimal values where base station was setup to 
transmit by broadcast sometimes and transmit to a particular node ID some others. At the 
later case, the third node was setup to be enabled to SYNC any node or communications in 
the air. A working configuration sample is shown below, where all nodes were setup to 
broadcast at the same time. Although this configuration works fine nevertheless it showed 
high sensitivity to distance and environmental noise. Fig 6.7 shows RSSI and noise value 
for the setup where all nodes were broadcasting at same time. It is obvious that nodes 
suffered from noise created by neighboring nodes when they transmit at same time  
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[0] S14: RTSCTS=1 
[0] S15: NODEID=0 
[0] S16: 
NODEDESTINATION=65535 
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Figure 6.7: RSSI and Noise values for local and remote nodes in Multipoint scenario 
obtained from mission planner (Top) and RFD-Design SW (Bottom) 
6.4 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, we discussed and showed the possibility to use the ISM band 900MHz 
for multipoint communications. Although, the data rate had to be dropped significantly 
(more than half), to withstand the noise created from environment and neighboring nodes, 
nevertheless, some tuning is possible to enhance the quality of the communications. The 
key observation from all experiments tat were conducted is that one needs to decide the 
size of the communication area, number of communicating nodes, data exchange rate, and 
the tolerated error. We also were able to achieve a better result in multipoint scenarios in 
term of data error rate when adjusting the NODE_DESTINATION and SYNC_ANY 
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parameters. However, the exchanged data rate was also dropped which means fewer data 
were able to be exchanged. In short, using the 900MHz to for monitoring nodes in an open 
area is cheap and possible solution in LOS environments. 
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APPENDIX A 
EVALUATION TOOL- TOWARD A REALISTIC VANET SIMULATOR 
In [24-25] authors have surveyed different network simulators that support building 
and simulating VANET. They evaluated at least 10 different simulators in terms of 
protocols and services in a variety of conditions (number of nodes, traffic, congestion, 
SNR, fading, path loss, etc). Based on the comparative study [24-25], we choose to use 
National Chiao Tung University Network Simulator (NCTUns) as an evaluation tool for 
this work. The simulator was originally developed as a network simulator with unique 
capabilities. Several releases have been introduced to accommodate new technology as 
they evolved. In this work we use the sixth release of NCTUns 6.0 that incorporate traffic 
simulation (e.g., road network construction and vehicle mobility models). 
A. Modules 
Several modules are supported by NCTUns that makes it flexible as an evaluation tool. 
NCTUns also support the integration of 802.11p/WAVE standards to provide a realistic 
evaluation results. Nevertheless, NCTUns also supports creating, modifying or adding 
modules to the workspace. 
B. Nodes Parameters & mobility 
When simulating VANET, we need to consider the different nodes (RSUs, OBUs). 
Each node need to be configured differently since different standards are available for 
different nodes. For instance, only RSUs can advertise on the CCH and announce
 73 
 
available services on different SCHs. Also, RSUs can't have any mobility models since 
they are infrastructural towers. On the other hand, NCTUns two different mobility models 
to support the mobility of vehicles nodes (agent-controlled \& Module-controlled). 
Additionally, NCTUns give free access through its GUI to adjust different parameters for 
each node (signal power, receiving sensitivity, fading models, obstacles, speed, direction 
etc.) which is supported by NCTUns. 
C. Channel Model 
Simulating using NCTUns enables user to choose from two kinds of channel models: 
Theoretical and Empirical. Within theoretical channel model NCTUns supports three 
theoretical path-loss models (free-space, two-ray ground, and free space and shadowing). 
Additionally, Rayleigh, Ricean and no-fading are also supported by the simulator to choose 
from as fading mode. 
